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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Increasing familiarity with the federal income-tax laws enhances one’s
interest in a subject that to most people seems dry as dust. The more one
comes in contact with the law and those entrusted with its administration
the greater is the interest in it, and that which at one time seemed hope
lessly complex and intricate takes definite form. Constant contact with
this subject opens vistas of human nature, economics and that wide field
of activity known as “business.”
Take, for example, the reaction on some congressmen that was caused
by the proposal of Secretary Mellon for tax reduction. What interesting
phases of the working of their minds is unfolded by their comments upon
the measure, in which it appears that some would reënact an excess-profits
tax so that the taxpayer having a small income would be relieved of
taxation and the burden would be shifted to those better able to bear it.
Others, while deprecating the fact that those with large incomes are prone
to invest in tax-free securities, still insist that there shall be no reduction
of the higher surtax rates, but vote down a bill to amend the constitution
so that income from federal, state, county and city bonds will become
taxable.
Without familiarity with this subject one would be without the enter
tainment these views of the people’s representatives furnish, and it would
be difficult to sort out from this mass of ideas that which is nearest the
truth.
Not alone in studying the attitudes taken by our congressmen will one
find entertainment and food for thought, for there are open to him the
treasury decisions that continually flow from the treasury department.
Read treasury decision 3521, wherein is set forth the plight of a taxpayer
who gave a cheque in payment of his tax March 10, 1921, and about a week
later the bank upon which his cheque was drawn was closed by the bank
examiner. As the cheque had arrived at the taxpayer’s bank before the
bank was closed and had been marked paid by the said bank the taxpayer
probably sustained a shock when he was asked to pay his tax again. His
cheque had traveled around the taxpayer’s section of the country the better
part of a week before it arrived at the taxpayer’s depository, and a delay
of twenty-four hours somewhere in its travels probably caused all the
trouble, for if it had arrived home one day earlier the bank draft issued
instead of the taxpayer’s cheque would have been properly cleared and all
would have been well. “It’s an ill wind that blows no one some good,”
however, and this subject engaged the attention of several attorneys at law
and that of District Judge Cushman of the United States district court
for the western district of Washington, southern division. What, do you
ask, is the moral of this sad tale ? It is this: if you were not interested
in income-tax matters you would not have known that Judge Cushman
ruled that the several banks through which this cheque passed in its journey
were not agents of the United States but of the drawer of the cheque, and
therefore until the money was safely deposited in the collector’s account

216

Income-tax Department
the tax bill was not paid. It is possible that you might have surmised
what the judge’s ruling would be, but the taxpayer and his lawyer did not.
(T. D. 3537—December 11, 1923)
Income tax.
Deductions: Losses—Voluntary removal of buildings.
Article 142, regulations 62, is amended to read as follows:
Loss due to the voluntary removal or demolition of old buildings, the
scrapping of old machinery, equipment, etc., incident to renewals and
replacements will be deductible from gross income in a sum representing
the difference between the cost of such property demolished or scrapped,
less salvage, and the amount of depreciation sustained with respect to the
property prior to its demolition or scrapping, and allowable as a deduction
in computing net income. However, if such property was acquired prior
to March 1, 1913, and its fair market value as of that date was less than
its cost, the deductible loss is the difference between such fair market
value, less salvage, and the amount of depreciation sustained prior to the
demolition or scrapping and allowable as a deduction in computing net
income. When a taxpayer buys real estate upon which is located a build
ing which he proceeds to raze with a view to erecting thereon another
building, it will be considered that the taxpayer has sustained no deductible
loss by reason of the demolition of the old building, and no deductible
expense on account of the cost of such removal, the value of the real
estate, exclusive of old improvements, being presumably equal to the
purchase price of the land and building plus the cost of removing the
useless building.
(T. D. 3538—December 11, 1923)
Income tax.
Deductions: Losses—Voluntary removal of buildings.
Article 142, regulations 45 (1920 edition) is amended to read as follows:
Loss due to the voluntary removal or demolition of old buildings, the
scrapping of old machinery, equipment, etc., incident to renewals and
replacements will be deductible from gross income in a sum representing
the difference between the cost of such property demolished or scrapped
or the March 1, 1913, value thereof if acquired prior to that date, which
ever is lower, and the amount of a reasonable allowance for the depre
ciation which the property had undergone prior to its demolition or scrap
ping; that is to say, the deductible loss is only so much of the original cost
or the March 1, 1913, value, if acquired prior to that date, whichever is
lower, less salvage, as would have remained unextinguished had a reason
able allowance been charged off for depreciation during each year prior
to its destruction. When a taxpayer buys real estate upon which is located
a building which he proceeds to raze with a view to erecting thereon another
building, it will be considered that the taxpayer has sustained no deductible
loss by reason of the demolition of the old building, and no deductible
expense on account of the cost of such removal, the value of the real estate
exclusive of old improvements, being presumably equal to the purchase
price of the land and building plus the cost of removing the useless building.

(T. D. 3539—December 11, 1923)
Income tax.
Deductions: Losses—Voluntary removal of buildings.
Article 155, regulations 33 (revised), is amended to read as follows:
Loss due to the voluntary removal or demolition of old buildings, the
scrapping of old machinery, equipment, etc., incident to renewals and
replacements will be deductible from gross income, in an amount repre
senting the difference between the cost of such property demolished or
scrapped or the value thereof as of March 1, 1913, if acquired prior to
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that date, whichever is lower, and an amount measuring a reasonable
allowance for depreciation which the property had undergone prior to its
demolition or scrapping; that is to say, the deductible loss is only so much
of the original cost, or March 1, 1913, value, if acquired prior to that date,
whichever is lower, less salvage, as would have remained unextinguished
had a reasonable allowance been charged off for depreciation during each
year prior to its destruction.
(T. D. 3541—December 19, 1923)
1. Income Taxes—Payment—Liability under Section 1314.
A check tendered in payment of federal taxes does not, under the pro
visions of section 1314 of the revenue act of 1918, discharge the liability
of the taxpayer until the check is actually paid in money.
2. Same.
The stamping of a check tendered in payment of federal taxes as
“paid” by the drawee bank and the return of the canceled check to the
drawer does not constitute payment where due to insolvency of the drawee
bank the amount of the check is not received in money by the collector.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
western district of Washington, southern division, in the case of United
States v. H. E. McKenney, is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Court of the United States for the Western District
of Washington, Southern Division. No. 3799. Decision on the
Merits.
United States, plaintiff, v. H. E. McKenney, defendant.
Thos. P. Revelle, United States attorney (W. W. Mount, assistant
United States attorney), attorney for plaintiff.
T. P. Fisk, attorney for defendant.
Cushman, district judge: This cause has been submitted upon the
following statement of facts:
It is hereby agreed and stipulated by and between Thos. P. Revelle,
United States attorney for the western district of Washington and attorney
for the above-named plaintiff, and T. P. Fisk, attorney for the above-named
defendant, that the following statement of facts may be submitted to the
court as the evidence in the above entitled cause:
On March 10, 1921, Mr. H. E. McKenney, above-named defendant and
a resident of the city of Kelso, Washington, was indebted to the United
States government in the amount of four hundred thirty-two and 08/100
($432.08) on account of income tax for the year 1920. On the day above
mentioned Mr. McKenney drew his personal check on the Kelso State
Bank payable to David J. Williams, then the collector of internal revenue
for the district of Washington, for the sum of $432.08. His check was
immediately transmitted to the collector of internal revenue at Tacoma,
Washington. Upon receipt of this check in the office of the collector of
internal revenue at Tacoma, there was stamped across the face of the
check the following words: “This check is in payment of an obligation of
the United States and must be paid at par. No protest. David J. Wil
liams, collector internal revenue.” The following indorsement was made
on the back of the check: “Pay to the order of Seattle branch, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, California. Income and profits-tax account.
David J. Williams, collector of internal revenue.” The check was received
at the office of the collector of internal revenue at Tacoma, Washington,
on the 11th day of March, 1921. On the same day it was transmitted to
the Seattle branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Cali
fornia, and deposited on March 12th to the credit of the collector of internal
revenue. The Kelso State Bank, upon which institution the check was
drawn, is located within the business zone covered by the Portland branch
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of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and following the usual
custom in such cases the aforementioned check was forwarded by the
Seattle branch to the Portland branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco. By the Portland branch this check was forwarded direct to
the Kelso State Bank. Upon receipt of the check this latter institution
drew a draft on the United States National Bank of Portland, Oregon,
and sent the draft to the Portland branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco. The check drawn by H. E. McKenney was canceled “paid”
and returned to the drawer, and his account was debited in the amount
of $432.08. At the time this transaction occurred the First National Bank
of Kelso, a member of the Federal Reserve System and a national bank,
was transacting a banking business in the city of Kelso, Washington.
Subsequent to the time that the Kelso State Bank forwarded the draft
on the United States National Bank of Portland to the Portland branch of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and prior to the receipt of the
draft by such branch of the federal reserve bank, the supervisor of bank
ing of the state of Washington, on the 17th day of March, 1921, closed the
Kelso State Bank. The draft was duly presented to the United States
National Bank of Portland, Oregon, for payment, but was refused on
account of the failure of the Kelso State Bank. The Portland branch of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco thereupon returned to the
Seattle branch a copy of the original check, which copy has been protested
for nonpayment. The Seattle branch in turn returned the copy of the
original check to the collector of internal revenue and charged the account
of the collector of internal revenue with the amount of the McKenney
check, to wit, four hundred thirty-two and 08/100 ($432.08).
Section 1314 (internal revenue act), 40 Statutes at Large, page 1057
(vol. 1, Supplemental U. S. Compiled Statutes, sec. 6371½
O), provides:
Sec. 1314. That collectors may receive, at par with an adjust
ment for accrued interest, certificates of indebtedness issued by the
United States and uncertified checks in payment of income, war-profits,
and excess-profits taxes and any other taxes payable other than by
stamp, during such time and under such regulations as the commis
sioner, with the approval of the secretary, shall prescribe; but if a
check so received is not paid by the bank on which it is drawn the
person by whom such check has been tendered shall remain liable for
the payment of the tax and for all legal penalties and additions the
same as if such check had not been tendered.
Whatever want of uniformity there may be in the reported cases upon
the general question of when a check will be treated as payment, in view
of the language of the foregoing section it is clear that congress intended
the person tendering a check in payment to the collector to remain liable
for the payment of the tax until it was actually paid in money. The fact
that the Kelso State Bank marked the check when presented “paid” and
issued its draft on the Portland bank in payment did not amount to pay
ment or in any way lessen defendant’s liability to the United States.
Former acts show the same intention, a change in which intention is not
to be lightly presumed.—Act of March 2, 1911 (36 Stat. L. 965) ; section
1010 of the act of October 5 [3], 1917 (40 Stat. L. 327).
In the course adopted in the transmitting of the check for collection
no departure is shown from well-established banking custom in such cases,
unless it be that the check was sent by the Portland branch of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco for collection to the drawee, the Kelso
State Bank. The want of uniformity in the discussion upon the question
whether this constituted negligence is sufficiently indicated by the follow
ing: 5 Cyc. (D), page 506-7; Kershaw v. Ladd (34 Ore. 375; 56 Pac. 402) ;
Morris Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin (63 Wash. 74, at 78 and 79); First
National Bank, Trinidad, v. First National Bank, Denver (Fed. Cas. 4810) ;
Farwell et al. v. Curtis (Fed. Cas. 4690).
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If it be conceded to be negligence on the part of the Portland bank to
so send the check to the Kelso State Bank, yet under the language of the
act (sec. 1314 before quoted) such negligence is not to be attributed to the
United States. If agency then be in the matter the collectors and banks
are agents of the taxpayers and not of the United States, until such time
as the tax is paid in money.
Judgment will be for the plaintiff.
(T. D. 3542—January 2, 1924)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Mandamus—Amended Returns.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise by the commissioner of
internal revenue of the power vested in him by section 212 of the revenue
act of 1918 to approve a change in a taxpayer’s accounting period from a
fiscal year to a calendar year, or to accept amended returns.
2. Accounting Period—Change from Fiscal to Calendar Year.
When a taxpayer voluntarily changed its accounting period from a
calendar to a fiscal year basis and filed returns on this basis, mandamus
will not lie to compel the commissioner to accept amended returns on a
calendar-year basis.
3. Judgment Affirmed.
Judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia denying
appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus (T. D. 3500) affirmed.
The following decision of the court of appeals of the District of
Columbia in the case of the Greylock Mills, a corporation, v. David H.
Blair, commissioner of internal revenue, is published for the information
of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. No. 4015.
United States ex rel. the Greylock Mills, a corporation appellant, v. D. H.
Blair, commissioner of internal revenue, appellee.
(December 3, 1923.)
Before Smyth, Chief Justice; Robb, Justice, and Bailey, a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Robb, justice, delivered the opinion of the court:
Appeal from a judgment in the supreme court of the District denying
appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the appellee, as
commissioner of internal revenue, to accept appellant’s amended income
and profits-tax returns for the calendar years 1918 to 1922, inclusive, and
to accept returns in future upon the calendar-year basis.
An answer was interposed to appellant’s petition, to which answer
appellant filed certain pleas. Appellee demurred to these pleas and the
demurrer was sustained.
The income-tax law of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1057), in part
provided:
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer’s
annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case
may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly em
ployed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; * * * If the tax
payer’s annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year, as defined
in section 200, or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or
does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of
the calendar year.
If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year to
calendar year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal
year to another, the net income shall, with the approval of the com
missioner, be computed on the basis of such new accounting period,
subject to the provisions of section 226.
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Since there was not sufficient time between the date of the passage of
this act and March 15, 1919, the date on which a return was required,
appellant filed on March 14, 1919, a tentative and cursory return, contain
ing the averment that it was not possible to file a complete return within
the time allowed for the following reasons: “No blanks available;
and auditors can not complete work.” A request therefore was made for
an extension of time, which was granted.
In the tentative return the tax was estimated on the calendar year
ending December 31, 1918. The real or complete return was filed on
June 14, 1919, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918. Annually there
after and down to and including the year 1922, as already noted, returns
were made upon the fiscal-year basis.
It is alleged and admitted, by the demurrer, that the fiscal-year basis
was first adopted by appellant upon advice of accountants, based upon their
interpretation of the act of February 24, 1919. It was further alleged by
appellant that the annual accounting period upon a calendar-year basis
clearly reflected its income for that period, and that prior to 1919 it had
filed its return on a calendar-year basis; that it never requested or received
permission of the commissioner of internal revenue to change its annual
accounting period from a calendar to a fiscal-year basis. It further appears
that for many years appellant regularly has closed its books on the last
days of March, June, September, and December; has computed its income
accurately for each of the quarters indicated; has taken a physical inven
tory on the last day of each quarter; has ruled down its books on June 30
of each year, and has held its annual stockholders’ meeting during the
month of July.
No protest or application for leave to change to the calendar-year
basis was filed by appellant until February, 1922. It is averred that the
request then made was based upon a recent ruling of the committee on
appeals in the internal revenue bureau in another case, in which a cor
poration had elected to file its return on a calendar-year basis. It appear
ing there that the books of the corporation were ruled down on August 31,
although also closed on December 31, the income-tax unit had sought to
require the corporation to file its return upon a fiscal-year basis. The
ruling was that, under the facts, the corporation was justified in filing its
returns on the basis of a calendar year and that “should not now be per
mitted or required to change the basis of filing its returns.”
Appellant’s application finally was denied and this suit filed.
The purpose of the income-tax law was the raising of revenue to meet
pressing needs of the government. The provisions of this law, at least so
far as they relate to the question here in issue, were reasonably free from
ambiguity. Whatever may have been the view of the accountants employed
by appellant as to the proper interpretation of those provisions, it was the
duty of appellant, within a reasonable time, to invoke the discretion of the
commissioner of internal revenue, if a change to a calendar-year basis was
desired. Instead of doing this, however, appellant thereafter filed several
returns upon a fiscal-year basis and paid its taxes accordingly. It will be
apparent at once that if taxpayers were to be permitted, several years
after voluntarily filing a return upon one basis, to compel the commis
sioner to accept returns for the same period upon a different basis, endless
and needless confusion would result and the real purpose of the law
measurably defeated.
As the supreme court has said, the writ of mandamus is awarded not
as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and
upon equitable principles. It is not within general statutes of limitation,
but is subject to the equitable doctrine of laches.—United States, ex rel.
Arant v. Lane (249 U. S. 367).
Believing that appellant’s delay in the present case was so long and
unexcusable as to amount to laches, we affirm the judgment, without con
sidering other questions involved.
Affirmed.
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(T. D. 3544—January 18, 1924)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Gross Estate—Tenancies by the Entireties.
A tenancy by the entireties is not created by a deed which conveys
property in trust to pay the income from a part to the husband for life and
from another part to the wife for life with remainders over to the survivor
for life.
2. Same—Transfers Intended to Take Effect at Death.
A conveyance of property to a trustee reserving the income for life
with joint power of revocation in the husband and wife is a trust intended
to take effect at or after death within the meaning of section 402 (c) of
the revenue act of 1918.
3. Same—Gifts Intended to Take Effect at Death—Consideration.
Where a husband conveys property to a trustee in trust to pay the
income therefrom to him for his life, then to his wife for her life, and
then to distribute the corpus, and the wife conveys other property of a
less value to the same trustee in trust to pay the income therefrom to her
for her life, then to her husband for his life, then to distribute the corpus,
the transaction is not “a bona fide sale for a fair consideration’’ within
the meaning of section 402 (c) of the revenue act of 1918.
4. Constitutionality.
Section 402 (c) of the revenue act of 1918 is not unconstitutional,
although it includes transfers or trusts made either before or after the
passage of the act.
The following decision of the United States district court for the
district of Maryland in the case of Safe Deposit & Trust Co., executor
of Talbot J. Albert, deceased, v. Galen L. Tait, collector of internal
revenue for the district of Maryland, is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., executor of Talbot J. Albert, deceased, v.
Galen L. Tait, collector of internal revenue for the district of Maryland.
memorandum of decision.
Soper, district judge: This case arises on the demurrer of the United
States to the suit of the executor to recover back the sum of $3,095.26 paid
by it under protest to the United States as a tax on the estate of Talbot J.
Albert under the revenue act of 1918, which became effective February,
1919. Mr. Albert died March 18, 1919. The commissioner of internal
revenue included in the net estate, upon which the tax was computed,
property covered by a deed of trust executed in 1911 and by certain addi
tions thereto in 1917 and 1918.
The first deed was executed by Albert and his wife, each of whom
conveyed certain properties to the trust company; the value of the property
conveyed by Albert was $166,944.28 and by Mrs. Albert $137,500. Three
subsequent grants of property by Albert to the trustee upon the same trust
brought the total of his contributions to $215,868.15. The deed provided
that the income from the property transferred by Albert should be paid to
him for life and that from the property transferred by Mrs. Albert to her
for life; the income from all of the property, at the death of either, to
be paid to the survivor for life, with certain remainders over. The trust
was irrevocable except by joint consent, and the powers of sale and rein
vestment of property, vested in the trustee, could only be exercised with
the approval of both grantors, during their joint lives.
The assessment is claimed to be unlawful on three grounds:
First. It is claimed that section 402 (c) of the act, which in terms
applies to transfers made before or after the passage of the act, is un
constitutional, as retroactive. This question has been passed upon by the
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circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit in the case of Schwab v. Doyle
(269 Fed. 321). This decision refers to the act of 1916, which the court
interpreted to apply to transfers made before as well as after the passage
of the law. The decision was reversed by the supreme court of the United
States in Schwab v. Doyle (258 U. S. 529), on the sole ground that the
circuit court of appeals had misinterpreted the act, and that the act was
not intended to apply to transfers made prior to its passage. There was
no intimation that the argument of the circuit court of appeals as to the
unconstitutionality of the act, if retroactive, was unsound. The decision of
the circuit court of appeals justifies the conclusion in this case that section
402 (c) of the act of 1918 is not unconstitutional because it includes
transfers or trusts made either before or after the passage of the act.
Second. It is contended that the deed of trust created an equitable
tenancy by the entirety in Mr. and Mrs. Albert. The decision of Schwab v.
Doyle (258 U. S. 529) is conceded by the government to be decisive if
such a tenancy was created. Since section 402 (d), subjecting such an
interest to the tax, has no clear statement to the effect that it applies to
tenancies created before the act, it must be held to apply only to those
created after the act.
A tenancy by the entireties is created by a conveyance to husband and
wife, whereupon each becomes seized and possessed of the entire estate,
and after the death of one the survivor continues to take the whole. No
special form of words need be used. On the other hand, such a tenancy
is not created if the terms of the conveyance evidence a contrary intention.
The deed in this case did not convey the whole estate to husband and wife.
It conveyed the husband’s property in trust, to pay him the income there
from for life, and the wife’s property similarly for her benefit. Each did
not become seized of the whole estate. The deed gave them certain joint
powers of revocation and supervision of investments, but no other joint
interest. Masterman v. Masterman (129 Md. 167) is cited as authority
for the proposition that a joint interest in income is not an incident of a
tenancy by the entireties, but the case merely decided that because of the
married women’s act (Maryland Code, art. 45, secs. 1 and 21), the husband
is no longer entitled as at common law to the whole income of such a
tenancy. The conclusion is that the deed did not create a tenancy by the
entireties.
Third. It is also claimed that the tax was improperly collected under
section 402 (c) because, although this section applies to transfers in respect
to which a trust is created, or which are made in contemplation of death,
or intended to take effect in possession at or after death, there is the fol
lowing exception: “Of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money
or money’s worth.” It is urged that the conveyance by Albert to the trus
tee of his property upon the trusts therein named, and the similar convey
ance of his wife of her property, were executed each in consideration of
the other in such a way as to amount to a bona fide sale for a fair con
sideration. It may be said from one viewpoint that the conveyances were
not absolutely without consideration, as is usually the case in transfers
made in contemplation of death; but even in such case it can hardly be
said that the circumstances constituted a bona fide sale for a fair consider
ation. There was no attempt on the part of either husband or wife to
exact each from the other a fair price for their respective conveyances.
The property conveyed by Mr. Albert in 1917 was considerably in excess
of the value of that conveyed by Mrs. Albert. In 1917 and 1918 he con
veyed additional property worth $48,923.87 without pretence of considera
tion. The transaction was not a sale. It was a family arrangement for
the disposition of the property of husband and wife, for the benefit and
protection of themselves and their children, and savored far more of a
testamentary distribution than of a bargain and sale. The demurrer will
be sustained.
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